

DDI- 02096/84

DDI CHRONO
3 Apr 84

22 March 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Intelligence

VIA: Director of Soviet Analysis

FROM:

Chief, Current Support Division
Office of Soviet Analysis

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SUBJECT: Request for Permission to Give an Oral
Presentation

REFERENCE:

STAT

1. I request permission to give oral presentations on the subjects of the CIA and national security and on the Soviet leadership (see attached request).

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2. To the best of my knowledge none of the material presented is classified.

3. My presentation on the CIA and national security will be essentially the same lecture I have given at other universities, on the Soviet leadership will be an assessment of the prospects for the Chernenko regime.

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4. I will be identified as a division chief with the CIA and will make the standard disclaimer that the views expressed are mine and not necessarily those of the Agency. I would not need commercial lodgings, but would stay overnight with an old colleague.

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SUBJECT: Request for Permission to Give an Oral Presentation


I have reviewed the attached request and with the understanding that the presentation will be unclassified, approve it.

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Acting Director of Soviet Analysis

3/29/89
Date

STAT


Deputy Director for Intelligence

3 APR 1989
Date

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DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY

February 15, 1984

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A mutual friend, [] has shown me a copy of your testimony before the Senate Intelligence Committee [] Your prescience on that occasion is most impressive and we would be honored if you could come to [] speak to us about the most recent change in the leadership of the Soviet Union.

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If you can come we would like to have you speak to my class in the History of the Soviet Union on the subject: "The Soviet Leadership --- Where Now?" As well, we invite you to address our majors and other interested students on the subject of: "The C.I.A. and National Security." Professor [] who is teaching a course in Central and Eastern Europe During World War II has also expressed a desire to have you address his class but he would easily understand if you felt that two talks in one visit was enough. If you did address his class it could be on a subject of your own choice which need not concern the World War II era.

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In the hope that you will be able to accept our invitation, let me propose concrete dates. Our first choice would be Monday and Tuesday, [] [] If you came, you would address my class on Monday and would speak to our majors and perhaps to [] class on Tuesday. If these dates are inconvenient, we can be quite flexible as long as we have about ten days lead time in order to publicize your visit.

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I understand that this must be a particularly busy time for you. Still, if you could manage to come talk to us it would be an invaluable experience for our students and for the members of our department as well.

Very truly yours,

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The CIA and National Security

I. Intelligence Gathering & Assessment

A. Long History

1. Moses, Joshua and Caleb
2. George Washington
3. Thru codebreakers of WWII

B. Every country has intelligence organization of some sort.

II. Extent to Which Intelligence a Recognized and Legitimized Function in Current Era

A. Read Several of Technical Articles of 1972 SALT Agreements.

1. At time, everything referred to in these articles classified TS by USSR.
2. Ability to negotiate such an agreement with such a secret society as USSR only possible because of groundwork laid by intell collection and analysis over many years. Not because they openly release any of this information.

B. Moreover, Article XII of ABM Treaty

1. No open inspections of any sort or responsibility to provide information openly.
2. Only example, to my knowledge, where treaties openly ratified by legislatures of both sides state, in effect, it is up to each side's intelligence services to monitor compliance.

(I will not, under any circumstances, get into issue of whether or not Soviets are indeed complying.)

C. Other Examples: Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

1. Signed and ratified by ____ countries.

2. Unlike SALT, on-site inspections with multinational inspectors.
3. Any signatory realizes that it may fool safeguards inspectors, but has additional worry; i.e., intelligence efforts of others involved.
4. According to NPT, any signatory can choose nationality of its inspectors. Again, final barrier against circumvention is intelligence effort. Even if a country would find a colluding inspector, could not be certain it could fool intelligence agencies involved.

III. So intell a vital link in the most sensitive relationships of the modern world--

- A. Vital not only in bilateral relations, but in areas critical to security of all.
- B. No country with leadership responsibility in this era can play its role responsibly without first-rate intell service.

IV. We at CIA consider ourselves to have one primary function.

- A. To give the policymaker the most accurate information humanly possible for him to base his policy decisions on.
- B. It is asking much for him to make correct decisions on basis of faulty information or assessments.
- C. Are we always right? No. Only someone who possessed full clairvoyance could be that.
- D. Besides, many situations ambiguous, decisions must be made on basis of developing/changing events.
- E. But we're satisfied that we work hard and long with the best people available to give him the best possible material.

The Soviet Leadership

Change of leaders Brezhnev-Andropov-Chernenko much too short for Soviet style.

Andropov legacy continuity

- ` Focused on need to rejuvenate elite and economy
- ` "Country moving again"
- ` Chose administrative measures (disc and anti-corruption)
- ` Make it work better rather than change it

On foreign policy--arms control

- ` Failure INF and START. Dead end
- ` Relations with West Europe worsened
- ` Only gains in mid-east can't be translated
- ` So leaves little of consequence

What can Chernenko achieve?

- ` Probably little; interim leader. -
- ` Continuation of Brezhnev legacy
- ` Supported by regional leaders and government ministries
- the most conservative and threatened
- ` `Cite Chernenko's original speech.

Doesn't mean nothing can be accomplished

- ` Obviously trying escape dead-end of Andropov's arms control policy
- ` Trying rebuild in Europe--Stockholm conference, MBFR, and meeting W. Europeans

But domestically, appears little hope

- ` GNP growth in 1983 will even further discourage economic tinkering
- ` Discipline campaign and anti-corruption bound to slip
- ` The Old Guard still in power

Next succession will be the deep one

- ` Gorbachev likely; true generational change
- ` The Old Guard will all go. Actuarial tables say so.
- ` Young managers like Dolgikh and Ryzhkov.
- ` Will be problems that must finally be addressed
- ` Resource problems will dictate policies

So chances are that next succession will make a difference.

- ` But how?
- ` Different opinions

The Soviet Leadership (continued)

My assessment; more vigorous, effort to update, desire
for more western technology, more dialogue with West